|Author ||R. Cobb-Stevens, J. Taminiaux, G. Granel, É. Rigal
Four essays explore the furthermost bounds of phenomenology. What they have in common is that they don’t consider the very concept of phenomenology as obvious, and that they try to put to the test the limits of the phenomenological project. Richard Cobb-Stevens displays the misinterpretations of Husserl’s conception of intentionnality by the analytical tradition. Jacques Taminiaux convincingly shows how Heidegger’s thought is determined, on some essential points, by Husserl’s phenomenological project. Gérard Granel puts forward a critical appraisal of the opening of Being and Time. And Élisabeth Rigal elucidates the unorthodox Wittgenstein’s “phenomenology” which seems, at first sight, not to deserve its name.